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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Yale Law Journal he declared that it would have been
better if no such rule had ever been stated as preventing
the introduction of testimony but that the inquiry should
be whether the parties by the writing made a substituted
contract discharging and annulling previous agreements,
and that on this question no relevant testimony should be
excluded.
"This is what the wiser courts, seeking justice in
each separate case, have in truth been doing. Operating
at times through exceptions and limitations, while not
denying the majesty of the supposed rule, they have
not precluded the parties from 'showing forth the
transaction in all its length and breadth'."' 7
This may be what the Court of Appeals was doing in the
Rinaudo case. If so, and granting that substantial justice
may have been done, the question remains whether it would
not be better to strike the rule altogether than to continue
to honor it more in the breach than in the observance. As
Corbin points out, if the parties mutually assent to a writ-
ing as the complete and accurate expression of the terms
of their agreement, the proof of any antecedent under-
standing is immaterial: the written contract prevails be-
cause it is the later in time, with or without any parol
evidence rule.28 Certainly any rule which functions to
obscure the true factual situation in favor of an artificial
conclusion of law may be looked askance; but if the rule
is basically invalid or if the conditions which gave rise
to it have substantially changed, the simpler course tending
to less confusion is to say so and dischard it in toto rather
than whitle it away by exceptions.
LOWELL R. Bow
The "Lord Mansfield Rule" And The
Presumption Of Legitimacy
Clark v. State'
In a bastardy proceeding instituted by Patricia Skosnick,
Ronald Clark was accused of the paternity of her child con-
ceived prior but born subsequent to her marriage to Joseph
1 Ibid, 632, quoting from Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N. Y. 332, 146 N. E. 618,
619 (1925).
0 Ibid, 633. For a later statement of Corbin's ideas see 3 CoRmN,
CONTRACTS (1951 ed.), See. 573.
1118 A. 2d 366 (Md. 1955).
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Skosnick. Upon conviction, Clark appealed, alleging error
in that the trial court admitted testimony of the mother
as to facts that would bastardize her child and as to non-
access of her husband, claiming that such testimony should
have been excluded under the Lord Mansfield Rule. The
Court of Appeals indicated that the Lord Mansfield Rule
applies to ante-nuptial as well as post-nuptial conception;2
and held, that in any event there was, as the trial court
found, sufficient proof aliunde to set aside the general rule
and to allow the mother, Patricia, to testify to any fact
other than non-access.3 As to the testimony of the mother
directly concerning non-access, the court found that, irre-
spective of this testimony, there was sufficient evidence to
permit the lower court to find that the appellant was the
father of the child.4
This case is interesting in that, first, although not neces-
sary for the decision, it extended by dictum the applica-
tion of the Lord Mansfield Rule to ante-nuptial conception
(being in this respect, the first case of its kind in the Mary-
land courts) and second, it held a very small quantum of
proof sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
upon which the Lord Mansfield Rule is dependent for its
application.
THE "LoRD MANsFnMD" RuLu
In 1777, Mansfield, L.C.J., in the often cited case of
Goodright v. Moss,5 set forth the rule which bears his name.
He declared:
"... the law of England is clear, that the declarations
of a father or mother, cannot be admitted to bastardize
the issue born after marriage.... it is a rule, founded in
decency, morality, and policy, that they shall not be
permitted to say after marriage, that they have had
no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spuri-
ous; more especially the mother, who is the offending
party."6
Although almost uniformlyadopted in the United States
at one time,7 the rule has, in later years, been the object of
vigorous criticism by text writers,8 and has been abrogated
- Ibid, 369.8 Ibi4, 370.
'Ibid, 372.
82 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
6 Ibid, 1257-1258.
7 WIGMOaM, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) 363, See. 2063; 7 Am. Jur. 640,
Bastards, Sec. 21; 70 C. J. 144, Witnesses, See. 176.8 WIOMORE, op. cit., ibid, 358-71; McCoRmIcK, EviDExzo (1954) 146, Sec. 67.
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by the courts of some states9 (in the interpretation of gen-
eral competency statutes) and by direct legislation in
others.10
The Maryland courts have consistently followed the
Lord Mansfield Rule." The recent case of Dayhoff v.
State,2 involved the prosecution of a husband for non-sup-
port of a child. The husband attempted to offer evidence
of declarations on the part of his wife that he was not the
father of the child. The court after quoting the Rule, noted
that it has been followed in this state in every case in-
volving legitimacy, and quoted the statement made in Hall
v. State" that:
"In this state the accepted rule is that where a child
is born of a married woman, neither the husband nor
the wife is a competent witness to prove non-access at
a time when, according to the laws of nature, the hus-
band could have been the father of the child, and that
neither the husband, the wife, nor the paramour will
be permitted to give testimony which will bastardize
the child until such non-access be first shown (...) but
if non-access is shown, either the husband or the wife is
9 Evans v. State, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N. E. 651 (1905) ; In re McNamara's
Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A. L. R. 313 (1919), where there was no
cohabitation of husband and wife within gestation period, but of. Hill v.
Johnson, 102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226 P. 2d 655 (1951), where there was co-
habitation and the rule was applied; State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 533, 233
N. W. 300 (1930) ; In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P. 2d 1051 (1933);
Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N. J. Eq. 242, 168 A. 840, 89 A. L. R. 904 (1933);
Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937) ; Yerian v. Brinker, 35
N. E. 2d 878 (Ohio, 1941) ; Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A. 2d 115
(Municipal Ct. of App., D. C. 1951).
"The Uniform Illegitimacy Act provided in 9 U. L. A. See. 16, "Both the
mother and the alleged father shall be competent but not compellable to
give evidence, and if either gives evidence he or she shall be subject to
cross-examination." Although this act has been declared obsolete and was
withdrawn in 1943 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (9 U. L. A.
XVII, Table 3), it is still the law of at least Wyoming: Wyo. Comp. Stats.
(1945, Off. ed.), Sec. 58.416. This result has been reached in other states
by independent legislation; see, among others: New York, Dom. Rel. Law
t(1950), See. 126, subdiv. 1; Massachusetts, 9 Ann. Laws (1933 and 1955
Cum. Supp.), Ch. 273, Sees. 1-7 (in non-support cases) and Secs. 11-19 (in
illegitimacy proceedings), both being interpreted in Sayles v. Sayles, 323
Mass. 66, 80 N. E. 2d 21, 4 A. L. R. 2d 564 (1948) ; Vermont, Vt. Stats.
(1947), Sec. 1738 (in divorce proceedings) as applied in Adams v. Adams,
102 Vt. 318, 148 A. 287 (1930).
U Crawfurd v. Blackburn, 17 Md. 49 (1861) ; Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md.
118, 31 A. 498 (1895) ; Howell v. Howell, 166 Md. 531, 171 A. 869 (1934) ;
Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 A. 318 (1937), noted, 3 Md. L. Rev.
79 (1938) ; Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319, 2 A. 2d 17 (1938), noted, 3 Md. L. Rev.
79 (1938) ; Hall v. State, 176 Md. 488, 5 A. 2d 916 (1939) ; Dayhoff v. State,
206 ,Md. 25, 109 A. 2d 760 (1954). See the note, The "Lord Mansfield Rule"




competent to testify to any fact other than non-access,
even though it tends to establish the illegitimacy of
the child."'"
Prior to the Clark case,15 all of the Maryland cases in-
volving application of the Lord Mansfield Rule were limited
to situations in which conception and birth both occurred
during marriage. In a majority of the states which con-
tinue to apply the Rule, the time of conception is imma-
terial; so long as birth occurs during wedlock, the presump-
tion of legitimacy and the exclusion of testimony arise."
In the often cited and leading Pennsylvania case of Denni-
son v. Page,7 the legitimacy of Mary Dennison was ques-
tioned in partition proceedings of the estate of one Page,
Mary having been born four months after the marriage of
her mother to Page. The court held that ante-nuptial con-
ception did not prevent application of the Rule and further
held: "That the mother was incompetent to prove this,
(non-access) is perfectly well settled by abundant and uni-
form authority. Non-access cannot be proven by either the
husband or the wife.. ."18
Although admittedly not necessary to the decision (since
non-access was held to have been established by sufficient
evidence aliunde), the Court of Appeals in the Clark case 9
indicated that the Lord Mansfield Rule applies to cases in-
volving ante-nuptial conception. The court (1) quoted
from a Delaware case2° the statement that where the Mans-
field Rule has been applied, it applies to cases of both ante
and post-nuptial conception, (2) noted that in the Dayhoff
case" the court relied on a Texas and a Nebraska case,"
both of which involved ante-nuptial conception, and (3)
concluded:
"If there is justification for both the presumption
and the difficulty of rebutting it where the child is
uI bid, 494.
llS A. 2d 366 (Md. 1955).
16I JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) Sec. 97; and see infra, n. 18.
1729 Pa. St. 420 (1857).
IsIbid, 423. Parenthetical material added. See also: Hicks v. State, 97
Tex. Crim. 629, 263 S. W. 291 (1924) ; Schmidt v. State, 110 Neb. 504, 194
N. W. 679 (1923), (These two cases were cited with approval in Dayhoff
v. State, 8upra, n. 11) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N. W. 527
(1908). For a collection of cases see: 70 C. J. 145, Witnesses, Sec. 176, ns.
90 and 91; 7 Am. Jur. 642, Bastards, Sec. 22; 8 A. L. R. 431; 60 A. L. R. 387;
68 A. L. R. 421; 128 A. L. R. 725; 31 A. L. R. 2d 1024.11 Supra, n. 15.
Morris v. Morris, 1 Terry 480, 13 A. 2d 603 (Del. 1940).
Supra, n. 11.
f Hicks v. State and Schmidt v. State, both supra, n. 18.
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begotten and born in marriage, because of the further-
ing of social policy, there is much the same justifica-
tion where there is ante-nuptial conception, knowledge
of the pregnancy and subsequent marriage of the
mother."28
In Maryland the operation of the Lord Mansfield Rule
is contingent upon the strength of the presumption of
legitimacy of the child, since once this presumption has
been overcome by outside proof of non-access, the child's
legitimacy having been thus destroyed, the Rule is set aside,
and either parent is then competent to testify as to any fact
other than non-access." It is crucial, therefore, to the Mary-
land application of the Rule to determine what evidence is
sufficient to rebut the presumption.
THE PrEUMPTON OF LEGITIMACY
It was at the time the Rule was formulated, and is
now,26 a well settled principle of the common law that a
child born in wedlock is presumptively legitimate. In the
early days of its application, this presumption was conclu-
sive, being overcome only by evidence of impossibility of
access or impotency of the husband." With the passage of
time, this strictness has been relaxed. In 1846 in the case of
Hargrave v. Hargrave," Lord Langsdale said:
"The presumption... is not to be rebutted by cir-
cumstances which only create doubt and suspicion; but
it may be wholly removed by proper and sufficient
evidence, showing that the husband was: (1) Incom-
petent. (2) Entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse
or communication of any kind with the mother. (3)
Entirely absent, at the period during which the child
must, in the course of nature, have been begotten; or
Supra, n. 15, 370. Italics added.
"Hall v. State, 176 Md. 488, 494, 5 A. 2d 916 (1939).
9 WIomoR, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) 448, Sec. 2527.
"Ibid, 449. There seems to have arisen an exception to the application of
this presumption in situations where, at the time of the marriage ceremony
the wife was pregnant and the husband married with neither knowledge
of the pregnancy nor premarital intercourse. Poulett Peerage Case, A. C.
395 (1903). Compare Morris v. Morris, 8upra, n. 20; Baker v. Baker, 13
Cal. 87 (1859) ; Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N. E. 605 (1885). The
husband in such a case was allowed to testify as to these facts. The excep-
tion is not applicable in the noted case, for it was shown at the trial that
at the time of the wedding ceremony the husband had knowledge of his
wife's pregnancy.
"1 BLAicKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Lewis' Ed. 1902) 457.
"9 Beav. 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (1846).
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(4) Only present, under such circumstances as afford
clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual
intercourse. Such evidence as this puts an end to the
question,"and establishes the illegitimacy of the child
of a married woman.""
Some of the States have taken the view that the pre-
sumption is weakened by proof that the child was con-
ceived before marriage," while others have held that ante-
nuptial conception does not weaken the presumption."1
Perhaps the better rule, if not the weight of authority, is
that so long as the birth occurs during wedlock the same
presumption arises and to overcome it the same degree,
of proof is required, if there has been either pre-marital in-
tercourse or marriage with knowledge of pregnancy, since
the former creates the possibility if not strong probability
of paternity, while the latter may be taken as an acknowl-
edgment thereof.'
Although there have been many and varied criteria or
formulae used to determine the sufficiency of presumption-
rebutting evidence, 88 the great majority of the American
courts have, in cases involving the presumption of legiti-
macy, demanded more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence, most of them requiring clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof and some even requiring, by the criminal
standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.4
The proof of illegitimacy required in Maryland was first
established in 1895 in the case of Scanlon v. Walshe,s where
"strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive" testimony
was required to overcome the presumption. However, in
the later case of Hale v. State,"8 in 1938, the court stated:
"In the trial of this case it was first established that
Edna Doney was a married wbman at the time of the
Ibtl, 458.
'*Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160 (1854) ; Jackson v. Thornton, 133 Tenn. 86,
179 S. W. 384 (1915) ; and see 8 A. L. R. 432 and 128 A. L. R. 725 for collec-
tions of cases.
" Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. St. 420 (1857) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa
37, 114 N. W. 527 (1908) ; and see 8 A. L. R. 428 and 128 A. L. R. 725 for col-
lections of cases.
USee note 26, 8upra.
a 128 A. L. R. 714.
8, McCoRmrcI, EVIDENCE (1954) 646-7, Sec. 309. See also In re Findlay, 253
N. Y. 1, 170 N. E. 471 (1930), where Judge Cardozo after reviewing the
various formulas concluded at page 473: "What is meant by these pro-
nouncements, however differently phrased, is this, and nothing more, that
the presumption will not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged
by a holding that it abides."
3S 81 Md. 118, 130, 31 A. 498 (1895).
U 175 Md. 319, 2 A. 2d 17 (1938), noted, 3 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1938).
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conception and birth of the child. This being so, the
presumption of its legitimacy arises with all the force
and favor the law accords to it, in support of the legiti-
macy of the child, and thus placed upon the State the
exacting burden to show to the contrary by clear, satis-
factory, and convincing evidence...."I'
Under this rule, the court determined that non-access had
been sufficiently proven by the following testimony: The
prosecutrix's mother, who lived on the same side of the
street about four doors away from her daughter's house,
testified that her daughter and the daughter's husband had
been separated for about three years, that the daughter
lived with her for a while and then went to live with a
sister-in-law, and that during this time she had neither
seen nor heard of her daughter's husband; the sister-in-law
testified that the prosecutrix had lived with her for about
one year, that during this period of time she had never
seen the husband although she had seen the prosecutrix
every day and every night, and that during the critical
period (the period when conception must have occurred)
the prosecutrix had gone to live with the defendant. Inti-
mate friends of the prosecutrix testified as to the same
general facts. It was further shown that the prosecutrix
and the defendant had treated the child as their own and
that the married woman and her mother sought to learn
the whereabouts of the husband. Speaking of this testi-
mony the court said: "It is rather difficult to perceive how
more clear and convincing proof could be offered of the
continued separation of this man and wife than here pre-
sented." 8 It should be noted that this finding was made
although, at the critical period, the wife was out of the
observation of each of the witnesses.
One year later, in the case of Hall v. State,"9 the Court
of Appeals, in holding for the defendant in a bastardy pro-
ceeding under the above rule, declared that the mere fact
of separation is insufficient where husband and wife lived
in the same city and met on friendly terms on at least one
occasion, and the wife had many evenings out for which
she did not account.
CONCLUSIONS As To THE INSTANT CASE
The court in Clark v. State" recognized that the pre-
sumption of legitimacy arises irrespective of the time of
-Ibid, 321.
SIbid, 324.
- 176 Md. 488, 5 A. 2d 916 (1939).
40118 A. 2d 366 (Md. 1955).
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conception where there is birth during marriage but said
that it was unnecessary to decide what standard of proof
would be sufficient to rebut the presumption since the State
had successfully proven non-access by the "clear, satisfac-
tory, and convincing" standard of the Hale case,41 stating,
"We think that the facts and the testimony in the Hale
case make it authority in this case."4 The proof of non-
access in the Clark case which the court found sufficient
to satisfy the strict standard of the Hale case was, first,
the testimony of Mrs. Dingle, a friend of the family, who
said that she introduced prosecutrix to her future husband,
they apparently being strangers to one another, at a time
when prosecutrix was four months pregnant and, second,
that "There is no indication in the testimony that Patricia
even knew or had heard of Skosnick before said intro-
duction." 3
It is submitted that this evidence of non-access is even
less "clear, satisfactory, and convincing" than that pre-
sented in the Hale case. But it is not suggested that the
verdict in this case was in any way erroneous since first,
as noted in the lower court opinion,4 testimony to prove
non-access must necessarily be "very sparse and sketchy",
and second, that "Once non-access had been established, the
supporting evidence which then became admissible made
it clear that the court well could have been convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was the father
of the child."45 This result was reached, however, by a
further lessening of the quantum of proof sufficient to:
rebut the presumption under the Hale test, establish non-
access, and make a decision on the Lord Mansfield Rule
unnecessary. Nor is this effect mitigated by the court's
subsequent observation that testimony that Patricia mar-
ried only to keep her baby, and Skosnick only to avoid mili-
tary service, and that he gave no sign that the child was his,
greatly weakened the presumption. 6
It is suggested that the admittedly proper result in this
case could have been reached either by holding that the
Lord Mansfield Rule does not apply to ante-nuptial con-
ception, thus limiting it, or by holding that the presump-
tion of legitimacy is weaker in ante-nuptial conception
41 Supra, n. 36.
2 Supra, n. 40, 372.
"Ibid, 371.
"State v. Clark, Criminal Court of Balto., Part III, 1955, Baltimore Daily
Record, Feb. 25, 1955 (Md., 1955).




cases, thus preserving the vigor of the test for post-nuptial
cases. Either would have been preferable to the decision
in this case which weakens a desirable presumption to avoid
a holding upon a widely discredited rule. Eighteen years
have passed since the Lord Mansfield Rule was first at-
tacked in this REVEw,47 and though the court has referred
to the Rule in derogatory terms,4 s its pernicious effect has
been avoided, as in this case, by decreasing the quantum of
proof necessary to set it aside, a result which is not desir-
able. Perhaps this case indicates that the Rule is too deeply
embedded in the law of this state to be readily overruled"
and that remedial legislation" is necessary.
RICHARU R. BuRGEE
State Labor Board Prevention Of Violent Union
Conduct, Even Though An Unfair Labor
Practice Under NLRA
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board and Kohler Co.'
Appellant union and appellee, Kohler Co., failed to reach
an accord concerning a collective bargaining agreement.
The company's production workers struck and picketed
the company premises. Ten days later the company filed a
complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
charging the appellant union and others with unfair labor
practices under the state labor act.2 The complaint alleged
"7Note, 3 Md. L. Rev. 79 (1938). The author, after discussing the Lord
Mansfield Rule, made a strong bid to the courts of this state to limit or
abolish it.
"The Court of Appeals in the Clark case, supra, n. 39, referring to the
rule, at page 368 said: "In 1777, Lord Mansfield was inspired - apparently
by some brooding omnipresence in the sky - to declare that 'decency,
morality and policy' required the law to be (such). . . ." Parenthetical
material supplied. Again, at page 369: "The Poulett Peerage case cited no
authority for its conclusion - it merely announced in certainties as Jovian
as those of Lord Mansfield that the law was so."
"7 WxoU0Ro, EVIDENCP (3rd ed. 1940) 367, Sec. 2063: "It may have be-
come, in some jurisdictions, too deeply planted to be uprooted." Cited in
Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 354, 196 A. 318 (1938).
8D Legislation is recommended on the order of 9 U. L. A. Sec. 16, as set
forth, supra, n. 10. For a caustic criticism of the Lord Mansfield Rule see
WO[roon, op. cit., ibid, Secs. 2063, 2064.
176 S. Ct. 794 (1956).
2 WiSC. STAT. (1953), Sec. 111 et seq.
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